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Complex dynamical systems driven by the unravelling of information can be modelled
effectively by treating the underlying flow of information as the model input. Complicated
dynamical behaviour of the system is then derived as an output. Such an information-based
approach is in sharp contrast to the conventional mathematical modelling of information-
driven systems whereby one attempts to come up with essentially ad hoc models for the
outputs. Here, dynamics of electoral competition is modelled by the specification of the
flow of information relevant to election. The seemingly random evolution of the election
poll statistics are then derived as model outputs, which in turn are used to study election
prediction, impact of disinformation, and the optimal strategy for information management
in an election campaign.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modelling and understanding of democratic processes such as election or referendum have be-
come increasingly important in recent years, in light of the potential threat to democracy posed by
the large-scale dissemination of disinformation on the internet and in other media (cf. [1, 2]). In
particular, in response to the widely publicised circulation of disinformation during the 2016 US
presidential election and the ‘Brexit’ referendum in the UK on the membership of the European
Union, a lot of research efforts have been devoted towards the detection, prevention, and retro-
spective analysis of false information circulated on the internet—the so-called fact checking—for
which there is already a substantial body of literature [3–9]. Whilst important, fact checking alone,
however, is insufficient to counter impacts of disinformation; what is equally important is the de-
velopment of dynamical modelling frameworks for democratic processes, and how dissemination
of disinformation might affect them, with a view towards scenario analysis, impact studies, and
strategic planning.
In response to this demand we have recently introduced an information-based framework for
modelling the dynamics of opinion-poll statistics in elections and referendums [10]. The idea that
imperfect information about candidates’ positions on issues, or about their competency and in-
tegrity, must play a significant role in modelling election has been argued previously, for instance
in [11], where game theory under incomplete information is applied to model electoral competi-
tion. In fact, various authors have explored the role of information in election. To name a few, in
[12] conditions for the existence of an equilibrium state are established when there are informed
and uninformed voters. The aggregation of information in election with imperfect information,
and conditions for establishing equilibrium, are investigated in [13]. There are also empirical
studies to show how voting pattern vary in accordance with how informed the electorate are [14].
In view of the prevalence of social media usage and the advances in mobile technology, where in-
formation can instantly be transmitted far and wide, the role of information in election modelling
is now becoming acutely more important. With this in mind, here we explore further details of the
election modelling by extending the work presented in [10].
What distinguishes the information-based approach of [10] from the previous work is that a
2dynamical model for the flow of information is specified as a starting point. How the flow of
information would affect the dynamical evolution of the opinion poll is then derived as an output,
rather than being modelled. This is achieved by borrowing mathematical techniques from signal
processing (cf. [15, 16]) of converting noisy information into the best estimates of the quantities
of interests. Because the transformation of the underlying information process into the output is
highly nonlinear, even with a relatively simplified model choice for the flow of information it is
nevertheless possible to describe dynamical behaviours of complex systems in such a way that it
is consistent with our intuition, as we shall demonstrate through various analysis and examples.
(That this is the case has been demonstrated in financial modelling for the price processes of
various assets, including credit-risky bonds [17], reinsurance contracts [18], or crude oil [19].)
When it comes to modelling electoral competition, in particular, we emphasise that our scheme
offers, to our best knowledge, the first fully-dynamical framework that captures the impact of
information revelation in a noisy environment; whereas previously proposed dynamical models
are either deterministic or else are not dependent on information revelation (see, e.g., [20–22]).
This, in turn, allows us to work out probabilities of the occurrences of future events explicitly, as
we shall demonstrate, and these results are indispensable for scenario analysis, impact studies, and
strategic planning.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section II with a brief overview of the two
approaches for modelling electoral competition proposed in [10]; one called structural approach
and the other called reduced-form approach. Our focus in the present paper will be on the latter
approach, which is developed further in Section III with the analysis of identifying the arrival of
new information in a noisy communication channel. The results are then applied in Section IV
to derive the formula for the a priori probability of a given candidate winning the election. The
dynamical evolution of the winning probability is then worked out in Section V. In Section VI
we examine the impact of disinformation on the winning probability. In particular, we identify
the optimal strategy for disinformation so as to maximally impact the winning probability, in the
case of a very simple model for fake news. More generally, the management of information in an
electoral competition is examined in Section VII, where we analyse how the winning probability
is affected as we vary the information flow rate in a time-dependent setup. The sensitivity of the
winning probability against the information flow rate parameter is analysed in Section VIII by
borrowing techniques from information geometry and working out the Fisher information. The
result will be useful for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis in an advertisement campaign. We
conclude in Section IX with a discussion on how the techniques developed in this paper can be
applied, mutatis mutandis, within the structural approach, to help election campaign in a realistic
setup, and more generally to manage information in advertisement. We remark that the purpose of
this paper is not in developing new mathematics, but rather to develop a novel information-based
approach to model the impact of advertisement, with a focus on electoral competition. Indeed,
most of the mathematical manipulations are elementary, and can be found, for instance, in [17, 23].
With this declaration we shall omit repetitive citation to these papers when similar calculations are
performed in different contexts.
II. INFORMATION-BASED MODELLING FRAMEWORKS FOR ELECTION
In [10] we introduced two closely-related approaches to model election dynamics: one is called
an election-microstructure approach, or a structural approach, which encapsulates structural de-
tails in a voting scenario; and the other is called a representative voter approach, or a reduced-form
approach, which captures qualitative features of election dynamics without the specification of
3structural details. Let us begin by briefly describing these approaches.
In the structural approach, one considers a set of issues that are of concern to the electorates.
These may include, for instance, the candidates’ positions on social welfare, immigration, abor-
tion, climate policy, gun control, healthcare, and so on. The l-th candidate’s position on the k-th
issue will then be represented by Xl
k
, whose value is not necessarily apparent to the voters. The
uncertainties for the factor Xl
k
thus make it a random variable on a suitably defined probability
space equipped with the ‘real-world’ probability measure P. The idea is that, for instance, if the
k-th factor were concerned with, say, climate policy, then in a simple model setup Xl
k
= 0 would
represent the situation in which candidate l is against implementing policies to counter climate
change, while Xl
k
= 1 would represent the situation in which candidate l is for implementing such
policies. Not all factors need to be binary, of course, but at any rate the voters are not certain about
the positions of the candidates on these issues, if they were elected.
The voters, however, possess partial information concerning the values of these factors, and as
they learn more about the candidate, or perhaps about the political party to which the candidate
belongs, their best estimates for these factors will change in time. The voters also have their
preferences: what is a desirable position of a candidate on a given issue to one voter may well be
undesirable to another voter. Let us denote by wkn the preference weight of the n-th voter for the k-
th factor, which may be positive or negative, depending on the voter’s position on that issue. Then
writing Et[X
l
k
] for the expectation under the probability measure P conditional on the information
available at time t, the score at time t assigned to the l-th candidate by the n-th voter, under the
assumption of a linear scoring rule, is given by the sum
S ln(t) =
∑
k
wkn Et[X
l
k] . (1)
In particular, the voter will select the candidate with the highest score at time T ≥ t when the
election takes place. Thus by modelling the flow of information associated with each of the factors,
we arrive at a rather detailed dynamical model for election, and this is the basis of the structural
approach.
In the present paper we shall be concerned primarily with the reduced-form approach and
develop the theory in more detail. We consider an election in which there are N candidates.
In the reduced-form approach, the voters are in general not fully certain about which candidate
they should be voting for, but they have their opinions based on (i) the information available to
them about the candidates, or perhaps about the political party to which they belong, and (ii) the
voter preferences. The diverse opinion held by the public can then be aggregated in the form of
a probability distribution, representing the public preference likelihoods of the candidates. Thus
we can think of an abstract random variable X taking the value xi with the a priori probability
P(X = xi) = pi defined on a probability space, where xi represents the i-th candidate, and the a
priori probability pi represents today’s opinion-poll statistics.
Today’s public opinion, however, changes over time in accordance with the unravelling of new
information relevant to the election. Hence the a priori probability will be updated accordingly,
generating a shift in the opinion-poll statistics. To model this dynamics, let us assume (merely
for simplicity) that reliable knowledge regarding which candidate represents the ‘best choice’ in-
creases linearly in time, at a constant rate σ. There is also a lot of rumours and speculations that
obscure the reliable information in the form of noise. This uncertainty, or noise, will be modelled
by a Brownian motion, denoted by {Bt}, which is assumed to be independent of X because other-
wise it cannot be viewed as representing pure noise. Hence, under these modelling assumptions
4the flow of information, which we denote by {ξt}, can be expressed in the form
ξt = σXt + Bt. (2)
For the voters, the quantity of interest is the actual value of X, but there are two unknowns, X and
{Bt}, and only one known, {ξt}. In this situation, a rational individual considers the probability that
X = xi conditional on the information contained in the time series {ξs}0≤s≤t gathered up to time t.
We proceed to determine the conditional probability P(X = xi|{ξs}0≤s≤t). We begin by remark-
ing that the information process {ξt} is Markovian. An intuitive way of seeing this is to observe
that the increment dξt of {ξt} is given by the sum of σXdt and dBt, but the coefficient of dt is
constant in time, while the Brownian motion has independent increments, so the process {ξt} of
(2) does not carry any ‘memory’. Establishing the Markov property is equivalent to showing that
P(ξt ≤ x|ξs, ξs1, ξs2 , . . . , ξsk) = P(ξt ≤ x|ξs) for any collection of ordered times t, s, s1, s2, . . . , sk.
However, the process {ξt} conditional on X = xi is just a drifted Brownian motion, which clearly
is Markovian, so we have
P
(
ξt ≤ x|ξs, ξs1, . . . , ξsk
)
=
∑
i
P
(
ξt ≤ x|X = xi, ξs, ξs1, . . . , ξsk
)
P(X = xi)
=
∑
i
P (ξt ≤ x|X = xi, ξs)P(X = xi)
= P
(
ξt ≤ x
∣∣∣∣ξs
)
. (3)
In addition to the Markovian property, the random variable X is a function of the time series {ξt}
because, with probability one we have
lim
t→∞
ξt
σt
= X. (4)
It follows that the conditional probability P(X = xi|{ξs}0≤s≤t) simplifies to P(X = xi|ξt).
The logical step of converting the prior probabilities P(X = xi) into the posterior probability
P(X = xi|ξt) is captured by the Bayes formula:
P(X = xi|ξt) =
P(X = xi)ρ(ξt|X = xi)∑
j P(X = x j)ρ(ξt|X = x j)
. (5)
Here the conditional density function ρ(ξt|X = xi) for the random variable ξt is defined by the
relation
P (ξt ≤ y|X = xi) =
∫ y
−∞
ρ(ξ|X = xi) dξ, (6)
and is given by
ρ(ξ|X = xi) =
1√
2πt
exp
(
−(ξ − σxit)
2
2t
)
. (7)
This follows from the fact that, conditional on X = xi, the random variable ξt is normally dis-
tributed with mean σxit and variance t. We thus deduce that
P(X = xi|ξt) =
pi exp
(
σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t
)
∑
j p j exp
(
σx jξt − 12σ2x2j t
) . (8)
5Inferences based on the use of (8) are optimal in the sense that they minimise the uncertainty
concerning the value of X, as measured by the variance or entropic measures subject to the in-
formation available. Thus the a posteriori probabilities (8) determine the best estimate for the
unknown variable X, in the sense of minimising the error.
In the reduced-form approach it is the conditional probability (8), which is a nonlinear function
of the model input {ξt}, that models the complicated dynamics of the opinion poll statistics. Our
objective in this paper is to investigate various properties of the model, as well as to explore
different ways in which the model can be exploited.
III. ELECTION DYNAMICS AND THE ARRIVAL OF NEW INFORMATION
We begin by considering the dynamical evolution of the conditional probability obtained in
(8). For this purpose let us introduce a simpler notation by writing πit = P(X = xi|ξt). Then an
application of Ito’s formula on (8) yields
dπit = σ(xi − Xˆt)πit
(
dξt − σXˆtdt
)
, (9)
where we have written
Xˆt =
∑
i
xiP(X = xi|ξt) (10)
for the conditional expectation of X given ξt.
Examining the dynamics of the conditional probability is of interest because it allows us to
isolate the arrival of new information. We remark that the time series {ξt} in itself contains new
information as well as redundant information that has already been identified. (It is often the
case that when one reads a newspaper article, for instance, only a fraction of what one reads is
genuinely new—and this tendency is more pronounced with the web-generated news contents,
which is becoming mainstream.) That the conditional expectation (10) gives the ‘best’ estimate
of X is then reflected in the remarkable fact that at time t, the small increment in the electorate’s
belief, represented by dπit, is induced only by the new information. In other words, the small
increment dWt of the process {Wt} defined by
Wt = ξt − σ
∫ t
0
Xˆudu (11)
represents the arrival of new information.
The process {Wt} defined in (11) is known as the innovations process in the theory of signal
processing [16]. It can be shown, in fact, that {Wt} is a standard Brownian motion. For this
purpose, we recall the Le´vy criterion for Brownian motion that if a process {Wt} is a martingale,
and if (dWt)
2 = dt, then {Wt} is a Brownian motion. To show that {Wt} is a martingale, we observe
for t ≥ s that
Es [Wt] = Es[ξt] − σEs
[∫ t
0
Xˆudu
]
= σtXˆs + Es[Bt] − σ
∫ s
0
Xˆudu − σ(t − s)Xˆs, (12)
6but from the tower property of conditional expectation we have Es[Bt] = Es[Bs], so writing Xˆs =
Es[X] in (12) we find, on account of Es[σsX + Bs] = Es[ξs] = ξs, that
Es [Wt] = Es[σsX + Bs] − σ
∫ s
0
Xˆudu = Ws , (13)
establishing the martingale condition. Then from (dξt)
2 = dt we find at once that (dWt)
2 = dt,
from which it follows that {Wt} is a Brownian motion under the measure P with respect to the
information flow generated by {ξt}.
With this observation at hand, we infer from (11) that the information process {ξt} in the ‘real-
world’ probability measure P is a drifted Brownian motion, which means that there exists a ficti-
tious probability measure Q under which the information process {ξt} is itself a Brownian motion.
The details of this measure change becomes handy in the analysis below for the probability of a
given candidate winning the election. To clarify the relation between the two measures P and Q
let us examine the denominator of the conditional probability obtained in (8), and define it to be
Φt =
∑
j
p j exp
(
σx jξt − 12σ2x2j t
)
. (14)
Then an application of Ito’s formula shows that
dΦt
Φt
= σXˆtdξt , (15)
from which, upon integration and making use of the initial condition Φ0 = 1, it follows that
Φt = exp
(
σ
∫ t
0
Xˆsdξs − 12σ2
∫ t
0
Xˆ2sds
)
. (16)
Therefore, on account of Girsanov’s theorem there exists an equivalent probability measureQ over
any finite time horizon such that the process {ξt} defined by (11) is a standard Brownian motion
in the Q-measure, where {Φt} is the change-of-measure density martingale. In particular, for any
measurable random variable Yt the conditional expectations in these two probability measures are
related according to
EPs [Yt] =
1
Φs
EQs [ΦtYt] and E
Q
s [Yt] = ΦsE
P
s
[
1
Φt
Yt
]
. (17)
IV. PROBABILITY OF WINNING AN ELECTION
We have derived in (8) the dynamical process for the a posteriori probability that the preferred
candidate is the k-th one. With this at hand we can ask a range of quantitative questions, for
instance, given that the upcoming election is in T years time, what is the probability that candidate
k will secure more than K % of the votes. We now address this question in the simple case where
there are only two dominant candidates. It is worth remarking that such a question cannot be
answered without a dynamical model at hand.
For a two-candidate election (or, equivalently, for a ‘yes-no’ referendum), we may label the
candidates using the binary system by calling them 0 and 1. In other words, we let x0 = 0 and
7x1 = 1; and accordingly, for the a priori probabilities we set p0 = p and p1 = 1 − p. Then the
conditional expectation of the random variable X is given by
Xˆt =
1∑
i=0
xiP(X = xi|ξt) =
(1 − p) exp
(
σξt − 12σ2t
)
p + (1 − p) exp
(
σξt − 12σ2t
) , (18)
which has the interpretation of representing the a posteriori expectation of the percentage share of
the votes for candidate 1, because in the binary case we have Xˆt = π1t.
We now examine the a priori probability P(XˆT > K) that candidate 1 will get more than K %
of the votes in the election to take place at time T in the future. We shall make use of the fact that
P
(
XˆT > K
)
= E
[
1{XˆT > K}
]
, (19)
that is, the probability of an event can be calculated by taking the expectation of the indicator
function for that event. To calculate the expectation in the right side of (19) we shall change the
measure P→ Q by use of the density martingale
Φt = p + (1 − p) exp
(
σξt − 12σ2t
)
. (20)
Then we have
P
(
XˆT > K
)
= EQ
[
ΦT 1{XˆT > K}
]
. (21)
We now observe that XˆT is an increasing function of ξt. Thus the condition XˆT > K is equivalent
to a condition on ξT . This can be worked out explicitly. We have
(1 − p) exp
(
σξT − 12σ2T
)
> K
[
p + (1 − p) exp
(
σξT − 12σ2T
)]
, (22)
from which it follows that XˆT > K holds if and only if ξT > z
∗√T , where
z∗ =
log
(
pK
(1−p)(1−K)
)
+ 1
2
σ2T
σ
√
T
. (23)
As indicated above, under the measure Q the information process {ξt} is a standard Brownian
motion, so we deduce that
P
(
XˆT > K
)
=
1√
2π
∫ ∞
z∗
e−
1
2
z2
(
p + (1 − p)eσ
√
Tz− 1
2
σ2T
)
dz. (24)
Therefore, if we define d− = −z∗ and d+ = σ
√
T − z∗, or more explicitly,
d± =
log
(
(1−p)(1−K)
pK
)
± 1
2
σ2T
σ
√
T
, (25)
then we have
P
(
XˆT > K
)
= p N(d−) + (1 − p)N(d+), (26)
8FIG. 1: Winning likelihood. The probability that candidate 1 will win the election in a year (T = 1), as a function
of the a priori probability p ∈ (0, 1) and the information flow rate σ ∈ (0, 0.75). In the limit σ → 0 where the future
uncertainty is large, the probability approaches a step function, whereas in the opposite limit σ → ∞ the probability
approaches a linear function of the current poll represented by p.
where
N(x) =
1√
2π
∫ x
−∞
e−
1
2
z2dz (27)
denotes the cumulative normal distribution function. By setting K = 1/2 in (26) we thus obtain
the probability that candidate 1 will win the election. This is sketched in Figure 1. We remark,
incidentally, that the formula (26) thus obtained for the probability that a given candidate winning
the election is essentially identical to the pricing formula in financial markets for an option on a
stock in the Black-Scholes model [24].
It is interesting to examine more closely the behaviour of the probability (26) of candidate 1
winning the future election. For instance, in the limit σ → 0 the probability as a function of the
current poll approaches a step function. That is, if, say, candidate 1 has 51% of support today,
then in this limit the probability of candidate 1 winning the future election approaches one. This is
because in the limit where the information flow rate going to zero, no information relevant to the
election will be revealed. Hence, in the absence of any further information, the current state will
be the future state, i.e. 51% of the voters will vote for candidate 1, and hence the probability of
winning approaches one.
In reality, of course, information unravels, resulting in the dynamical evolution of the poll. In
Figure 2 we plot the cross-section of (26) for two values of σ. If the current poll were the reflec-
tion of the election predictor, then the probability of a given candidate winning the future election
would be a linear function of the current popularity, i.e. the current support rate equals the likeli-
hood of election victory. However, according to the information-based model, the correspondence
90.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1 -p
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
WinningProbability
FIG. 2: Winning likelihood. The probability that candidate 1 will win the election in a year (T = 1), as a function
of the current popularity rate 1 − p for the candidate. If today’s poll were the predictor for the winning probability,
then the function should be a straight line shown here (in brown). However, according to the information-basedmodel
we see that the actual likelihood of winning the election is higher than what today’s poll might suggest if 1 − p > 1
2
;
and conversely lower than what the poll suggests if 1 − p < 1
2
. Two examples are shown, corresponding to the values
σ = 0.15 (in purple) and σ = 0.95 (in magenta) for the information flow rate. The result shows that the deviation
away from the poll indicator is greater if future uncertainty is greater (smaller σ).
is nonlinear. In particular, if today’s support rate of a candidate is greater than 50%, then the like-
lihood of that candidate winning the future election is always greater than what is suggested by
today’s poll, and conversely if the current support rate is less than 50% then the actual likelihood
of winning is smaller than what is suggested by today’s poll. Furthermore, the gap between today’s
poll and the winning likelihood increases as the future uncertainty increases.
V. PREDICTING THE ELECTION OUTCOME
In the foregoing analysis, we have introduced an abstract random variable X that represents
in some sense the ‘preferred’ candidate. Consequently, the conditional expectation Xˆt of X does
not converge to any one of the candidates because the variability in public opinion remains wide
leading up to the election day. From the viewpoint of a campaign manager, an election pollster, an
election pundit, or a betting agency involved in elections, however, what matters is not so much
about an abstract idea of which candidate might ultimately be judged by history to be the most
ideal candidate. What matters to them is the more concrete notion of who might actually win the
election.
To model the prediction of an election we require a dynamical version of the winning proba-
bility (26). To keep the discussion simple, let us for the moment continue on the assumption that
there are only two candidates: candidate 0 and candidate 1. Then the probability that candidate 1,
say, winning the election has to converge to either zero or one, depending on the election outcome.
In other words, we need to consider the probability
Pt
(
XˆT > K
)
= Et
[
1{XˆT > K}
]
(28)
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conditional on the information available up to time t. This conditional probability process will
then evolve in a random manner such that it will converge to either zero or one, as the election day
approaches, i.e. as t → T .
As a matter of clarification we remark that (28) represents a dynamical extension of the a priori
probability (26) in the sense that while (26) with K = 1/2 represents the current (at time t = 0)
probability that candidate 1 will secure a win on the election day at t = T , this probability will
change from day to day dynamically in accordance with the revelation of new information, so in
particular given the information available at time t the winning probability changes to (28) with
K = 1/2.
To work out the conditional expectation in (28) we begin by remarking that the model under
consideration entails a dynamic consistency in the following sense. Suppose that information
has been gathered until time s ∈ [0, t] so that the a priori probability pi has changed into the a
posteriori probability πis = P(X = xi|ξs). Then starting from this point, and given the knowledge
of the past {ξu}0≤u≤s, the reinitialised information process commencing from time s, according to
the original model (2) for information flow, will take the form
ξst = ξt − ξs = σX(t − s) + (Bt − Bs). (29)
Thus, starting from time s, what was the a posteriori probability πis now becomes the a priori
probability for the future times t ≥ s, so according to the logic leading to (8) the new a posteriori
probability πit = P(X = xi|ξt) should be of the form
πit =
πis exp
(
σxiξst − 12σ2x2i (t − s)
)
∑
j π js exp
(
σx jξst − 12σ2x2j(t − s)
) . (30)
Substituting the expressions for ξst and πis in (30), a short calculation shows that the resulting
expression indeed agrees with that obtained in (8), thus establishing dynamic consistency of the
model.
The dynamic consistency implies that to work out the conditional expectation in (28) it suffices
to recycle the calculation leading up to (26) instead of performing a direct calculation making use
of the time-dependent version of the measure change rule EPt [YT ] = E
Q
t [ΦT YT ]/Φt. In particular,
we deduce at once that
Pt
(
XˆT > K
)
= πt N(d
−
t ) + (1 − πt)N(d+t ), (31)
where πt = P(X = 0|ξt) and
d±t =
log
(
(1−πt)(1−K)
πtK
)
± 1
2
σ2(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
. (32)
Setting K = 1/2 in (31) we obtain the a posteriori probability that candidate 1 will win the elec-
tion to take place at time T , and this indeed converges to either zero or one, depending on how
information unravels along the way. Figure 3 shows five sample-path simulations of the condi-
tional probability process. We remark, incidentally, that if there are more than two candidates,
say, N candidates competing, then the corresponding a posteriori probability at time t that the kth
candidate winning the election to take place at time T is determined by computing Pt(πkT > N
−1).
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FIG. 3: Dynamics of election prediction. The probability Pt
(
XˆT > 1/2
)
at time t that candidate 1 will win the
election to take place at time T is simulated. Five sample paths are shown here, with the parameter values p = 0.48,
σ = 0.5, and T = 1.
VI. IMPACT OF DISINFORMATION: WHEN TO RELEASE FAKE NEWS?
The information-based model for election naturally allows for a generalisation to model sit-
uations in which there are disinformation in circulation, with a deliberate intent to obscure the
true value of X. In particular, in [10] we have defined what one might mean by ‘fake news’ as a
modification of the information process (2) in the following form:
ηt = σXt + Bt + Ft, (33)
where the term {Ft}, which has a bias so that E[Ft] , 0, models deliberate disinformation. The
idea can be described as follows. There are unfounded rumours and speculations obscuring the
value of X, but a large number of such random speculations will average over to give rise to
an unbiased noise so that E[Bt] = 0. In other words, while noise will interfere with giving an
accurate estimate for X, it is not directed in any particular orientation; whereas fake news can be
distinguished from conventional noise by its desire to disorient the public. Thus, those who are
not aware of the existence of {Ft} will arrive at their estimates based on formula (8), but with the
distorted information {ηt} in place of {ξt}. In other words, they will ‘perceive’ the information as
taking the normal form (2) and proceed to make appropriate inferences based on (8); but their
inferences are now skewed owing to the existence of {Ft}.
In the information-based model, the effect of disinformation can be understood in an intuitive
and transparent manner: if E[Ft] > 0 then people (unaware of the existence of {Ft}) are misguided
to thinking that the true value of X is greater than what it really is; and similarly, if E[Ft] < 0 then
people are misguided to thinking that the true value of X is less than what it really is. By choosing
specific models for the process {Ft} one can therefore apply a simulation study to determine, for a
given choice of {Ft}, how the opinion-poll statistics might be affected in that situation.
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From the viewpoint of those who wish to disseminate disinformation, the most obvious question
that arises is: How to find optimum choice for {Ft}? Evidently, the notion of optimality depends on
the choice of the criteria, but in the present context perhaps the most natural one is that maximises
the probability of a given candidate winning the election. In general, finding a solution to this
question requires solving a new type stochastic optimisation problem that combines both (a) the
theory of signal detection and in particular nonlinear filtering [16], and (b) the theory of change-
point detection problem [25]. Thus, we encounter a situation here in which a new type of problem
in society leads to a new type of mathematical challenge.
Here we shall analyse this problem in a simple setup in which there is only one chance for
disseminating fake news. Hence the problem is to find the optimal timing to release fake news so
as to maximise its impact on the upcoming election. We shall assume, in particular, a model for
fake news of the form Ft = µ(t − τ) e−α(T−τ) 1{t > τ}, where µ and α > 0 are constants, τ denotes
the time at which fake news are released, and 1{t > τ} as before denotes the indicator function so
that 1{t > τ} = 0 if t ≤ τ and 1{t > τ} = 1 otherwise. This choice of Ft has the interpretation that
when fake news are released at time τ, initially their strengths grow linearly in time at the rate µ,
but over time the strengths of fake news get suppressed exponentially at the rate α.
Let us consider the problem in the context of a two-candidate election. Recall that in the
absence of disinformation the probability of candidate 1 securing an election win has been worked
out in (26) with K = 1/2. If, however, disinformation is disseminated in such a way that the voters
are unaware of this, then this probability is altered in the following way. Noting that (26) has been
obtained by assuming a genuine information flow {ξt}, if in reality this is replaced by {ηt}, then the
threshold value z∗ of (23) is now replaced by z∗ − FT/
√
T . This follows on account of the fact
that the original condition was ξT > z
∗√T , but in the presence of disinformation ξT is replaced
by ξT + FT ; hence the condition now reads ξT > (z
∗ − FT/
√
T )
√
T . Accordingly, the variables d±
are replaced by d± + FT/
√
T . The effect of this is to increase (respectively, decrease) the winning
probability P(XˆT > 1/2) for candidate 1 if FT > 0 (respectively, if FT < 0). Thus, in principle
one can optimise the form of {Ft} so as to maximise (or minimise) the probability P(XˆT > 1/2).
However, in reality, owing to the Markovianity of {ξt} along with the assumption that the existence
of {Ft} is hidden from the voters, maximum impact is obtained in this case by simply maximising
FT . In the case of the model Ft = µ(t − τ) e−α(T−τ) 1{t > τ}, therefore, to achieve a maximum
impact on the election outcome, fake news should be released at
τ∗ =
αT − 1
α
(34)
if α > T−1, and at τ∗ = 0 if α ≤ T−1.
In Figure 4 we plot the probability P(XˆT > 1/2) of candidate 1 winning the election in the
presence of fake news as a function of the release timing τ. For the parameter choices made
therein, we see that in the absence of fake news, if the a priori probability (today’s opinion poll)
for candidate 1 to win the election is 1−p = 49.5%, then the actual probability (today’s prediction)
of winning the election one year later is about 47.3%. However, the release of fake news in favour
of candidate 1, if undetected by the voters, will enhance this likelihood whenever it is released
prior to the election day. If, in particular, the release timing is optimised, then the probability can
be enhanced by as much as 5.5% (in this example), perhaps just sufficient to overcome statistical
uncertainties for candidate 1 to secure a victory. The specific figures mentioned here are of course
based on an arbitrarily chosen model parameters, but the model clearly illustrates the impact of
fake news in an intuitive manner, and allows for a more comprehensive impact studies, scenario
analysis, as well as analysis on parameter sensitivity; the results of which we hope will then be fed
into the development of counter measures to tackle the impact of fake news.
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FIG. 4: Winning likelihood. The probability that candidate 1 will win the election to take place in one year (T = 1),
as a function of the timing τ at which fake news in favour of candidate 1 are released, is plotted, when we set α = 5.
The figure shows that by releasing fake news four-fifth of the way into the election period, the probability of candidate
1 winning the election can be enhanced by about 5.5% (from about 47.3% to about 52.8%). Other model parameters
are: σ = 0.3 for the information flow rate, p = 0.505 for the a priori probability that candidate 0 wins the election,
and µ = 1.5 for the fake news strength.
VII. MANAGING INFORMATION FLOW IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
In the previous section, and more generally in [10], we examined the impact of the dissem-
ination of disinformation on the dynamics of the opinion poll statistics. It should be apparent,
however, that the framework is not restricted to modelling disinformation. For instance, if the cam-
paign team is confident about the value of X, then they can proactively promote (or perhaps to hide)
relevant information, but not in secret. In the simplest situation one could set Ft = κX(t−τ)1{t > τ}
for some κ > 0, where {Ft} now represents genuine information. Then from time τ onwards the
voters will obtain more reliable information about X than otherwise. This is equivalent to having a
time-dependent information flow rate σt such that σt = σ for t ≤ τ and σt = σ+ κ for t > τ. More
generally, we may consider a generic time-dependent information flow rate σt. If the campaign
team is in the position to control certain information, then they would naturally like to optimise the
way in which information is managed so as to maximise the chances of their candidate winning the
election. (In fact, as explained in the final section below, such a situation is very natural within the
structural approach; whereas in the reduced-form approach the random variable X is to an extent
an abstraction so it is not always apparent whether the campaign team can manage information on
X. However, because the mathematical treatment of the problem in either of the frameworks is the
same, and because the present paper is concerned with the reduced-form model, we shall proceed
to develop the idea here, with the caveat that practical implementations of the ideas presented in
this section are more suitable within the structural framework.)
In the general case for which the information flow rate is time dependent, the information
process takes the form
ξt = X
∫ t
0
σsds + Bt. (35)
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In this case, the information process {ξt} is no longer Markovian so that we do not have the simpli-
fying reduction P(X = xi|{ξs}0≤s≤t) → P(X = xi|ξt). In other words, the conditional probability for
the random variable X is now path dependent. To work out the posterior probabilities we begin by
remarking that if we define the process {Φt} according to
Φt = exp
(
X
∫ t
0
σsdξs −
1
2
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)
, (36)
then we can use the unit-initialised martingale {Φt} to change probability measure P → Q with
the property that (i) the information process {ξt} is a Brownian motion under Q independent of
X; (ii) the random variable X has the same probability law under Q as it does under P; and (iii)
the conditional expectation ft = E
P[ f (X)|{ξs}0≤s≤t] for a function of the random variable X can be
obtained by use of the Kallianpur-Striebel [26] formula
ft =
EQ[ f (X)Φt|{ξs}0≤s≤t]
EQ[Φt|{ξs}0≤s≤t]
. (37)
By setting f (X) = 1{X = xi} in (37) we thus deduce the expression for the conditional probability
πit = P(X = xi|{ξs}0≤s≤t) with time-dependent information flow:
πit =
pi exp
(
xi
∫ t
0
σsdξs − 12 x2i
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)
∑
j p j exp
(
x j
∫ t
0
σsdξs − 12 x2j
∫ t
0
σ2sds
) , (38)
from which the best estimate Xˆt for X can be obtained according to Xˆt =
∑
i xiπit.
Let us proceed further by considering, as in Section IV, the case in which there are only two
candidates. Then we have
XˆT =
(1 − p) exp
(∫ T
0
σsdξs − 12
∫ T
0
σ2sds
)
p + (1 − p) exp
(∫ T
0
σsdξs − 12
∫ T
0
σ2sds
) , (39)
which is an increasing function of a single Gaussian random variable
∫ T
0
σsdξs. It follows that
XˆT > K holds if and only if
∫ T
0
σsdξs√∫ T
0
σ2sds
>
log
(
pK
(1−p)(1−K)
)
+ 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds√∫ T
0
σ2sds
. (40)
On account of the relation P(XˆT > K) = E
Q[ΦT1{XˆT > K}], where {ΦT } is the denominator of
(39), a short calculation then shows that
P
(
XˆT > K
)
= p N(d−) + (1 − p)N(d+), (41)
where
d± =
log
(
(1−p)(1−K)
pK
)
± 1
2
∫ T
0
σ2sds√∫ T
0
σ2sds
. (42)
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Setting K = 1/2 in (41) we thus obtain the probability that candidate 1 wins the future election,
when information flow rate {σt} is time dependent.
From the viewpoint of the campaign team for candidate 1, if they had the ability to control
the rate of information flow, then it would be desirable to find a {σt} that maximises the success
probability (41). The basic idea can already be inferred from inspecting Figure 2 in the case of
constant σ: depending on the value of the a priori probability p, one would like to either let
σ → ∞ or to let σ → 0 so as to impact the probability of a given candidate winning the future
election. These extreme cases, however, are unrealistic (even in the structural model): release
of information (marketing) is in general costly. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, if the
campaign period is [0, T ], then the number
∫ T
0
σs ds is strictly bounded.
With this in mind, we examine how the winning probability P = P(XˆT > 1/2) for candidate
1 changes as the information flow rate σt is varied. To this end let us consider the functional
derivative of P with respect to σt. That is, regarding P = P[σ] as a functional of σ, we consider
perturbing σt by a small amount ǫ in the direction of φt:
δP
δσ
= lim
ǫ→0
P[σ + ǫφ] − P[σ]
ǫ
. (43)
Then a short calculation shows that
δP
δσ
=
1√
2π
[
p e−
1
2
(d−)2 δd
−
δσ
+ (1 − p) e− 12 (d+)2 δd
+
δσ
]
, (44)
where
δd±
δσ
=
∫ T
0
σsφsds√∫ T
0
σ2sds

log
(
pK
(1−p)(1−K)
)
∫ T
0
σ2sds
± 1
 . (45)
From (44) we deduce that the perturbation on P is proportional to the inner product
∫ T
0
σsφsds
between {σt} and {φt}. Therefore, for a given {σt} one can explore how it may be perturbed so as
to either increase or decrease P. In practical applications, however, it is likely that one would be
working with a parametric family of models for the information flow rates {σt}, and in this case
optimisation can be achieved with normal differentiation, not with a functional derivative.
We note, more generally, that the way in which the winning probability P changes against a
perturbation of the information flow rate today will not be the same as what it is tomorrow. Indeed,
the a posteriori probability πt = P(X = x0|{ξs}0≤s≤t) tomorrow may change from the a priori
probability p today in such a way that while there is an advantage in increasing σ today, it would
be advantageous to decrease σ tomorrow. In other words, what we require is a dynamical version
of (44) based on the conditional version of the winning probability: Pt = P(XˆT > 1/2|{ξs}0≤s≤t).
This can be worked out straightforwardly, and we deduce that the result takes a form identical to
(44), except that p is replaced by πt,
∫ T
0
σ2sds is replaced by
∫ T
t
σ2sds, and
∫ T
0
σsφsds is replaced
by
∫ T
t
σsφsds.
VIII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Another aspect of the information-based model that will be useful to explore for strategic plan-
ning is concerned with parameter sensitivity. If, for instance, releasing of information is costly
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(e.g., advertising cost), and if the result is not likely to significantly change the state of affairs,
then it may not be advantageous to proceed with the release. For such a consideration, knowledge
of the parameter sensitivity of the model will help in assisting decision making.
In the present context, we are interested, in particular, in the parameter sensitivity of the proba-
bility distribution of the future random variable XˆT . Let us therefore begin by working out the
a priori density function for XˆT . Recalling that the density function ρ(x) for XˆT is given by
ρ(x) = dP(XˆT < x)/dx, we deduce, by differentiating (26), that
ρ(x) =
1√
2πσ2T x(1 − x)
[
p e−
1
2
(d−)2 + (1 − p)e− 12 (d+)2
]
, (46)
where
(d±)2 =

log
(
(1−p)(1−x)
px
)
σ
√
T

2
+
1
4
σ2T ± log
(
(1 − p)(1 − x)
px
)
. (47)
In Figure 5 we plot the density function ρ(x) for different values of the parameter σ. It may not
be immediately apparent from (46) that ρ(x) is a density function satisfying the normalisation
condition
∫ 1
0
ρ(x)dx = 1 (although by definition ρ(x) clearly is a density function), but in fact ρ(x)
is a Gaussian mixture density in a transformed variable. To see this, let use change the variable
x → u according to
u = log
(
1 − x
x
)
, (48)
and likewise to simplify the notation let us define β = log[(1−p)/p]. Then it should be immediately
apparent that while x varies from 0 to 1, u varies from ∞ to −∞. Together with the fact that
du = −dx/x(1 − x) we thus deduce that the density function f (u) for the transformed variable
UT = log[(1 − XˆT )/XˆT ] takes the form
f (u) =
1
1 + eβ
1√
2πσ2T
[
e
− 1
2σ2T
(u−(β−σ2T/2))2 + eβe−
1
2σ2T
(u−(β+σ2T/2))2
]
, (49)
which we recognise at once to be a normalised Gaussian mixture density.
With the expression for the density function at hand we are in the position to address the ques-
tion regarding parameter sensitivity. We are interested, in particular, in the sensitivity of the model
against the information flow rate σ and the current poll statistics p, for, σ can be directly linked to
the advertisement cost, while the value of p can be deduced from pollsters. For this analysis we
shall borrow ideas from information geometry (see, e.g., [27, 28]) to determine the parameter sen-
sitivity, i.e. we shall examine the Fisher information matrix (or the Fisher-Rao metric) associated
with the parameters σ and p. The Fisher-Rao information metric Gi j(σ, p) is useful inasmuch as
it introduces the notion of a metric in the space of density functions that determines the relative
separation of the densities for different parameter values. In other words, the amount of impact
caused by changing, say, the value of the information revelation rate from σ to σ′ is in general
not related to the naive difference σ − σ′. Instead, it is measured in terms of the geodesic dis-
tance associated with the Fisher-Rao information metric. Writing θ1 = σ and θ2 = p, the Fisher
information is determined by expression
Gi j(σ, p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
f (u)
∂ f (u)
∂θi
∂ f (u)
∂θ j
du. (50)
17
FIG. 5: Density function for XˆT . The a priori probability density ρ(x) for the random variable XˆT is shown here
for different values of the information flow-rate parameter σ ∈ [0.25, 0.75]. Other model parameters are p = 0.5 and
T = 1.
It should be noted here that the Fisher-Rao metric, unlike invariant quantities such as the curva-
ture, is not strictly invariant under the variable transformation XT → UT . However, under certain
regularity conditions, Chentsov’s theorem shows that the Fisher information is, up to scaling, the
only invariant metric under certain statistically important transformations [29]. Hence, without
loss but for the gain of computational simplicity we shall investigate the Fisher information asso-
ciated with the density function f (u), rather than that for ρ(x). Specifically, if we substitute (49)
in (50), then after a short calculation we deduce that
Gi j(σ, p) =
 T +
2
σ2
2p−1
σp(1−p)
2p−1
σp(1−p)
1
p(1−p)
(
1 + 1
σ2T p(1−p)
)
 . (51)
On inspection of the one-dimensional subspace parameterised by the information revelation rate
σ, the corresponding Fisher information is just a constant T plus the the Fisher information 2/σ2
associated with the normal density function of standard deviation σ, and this is decreasing in σ,
indicating the that the smaller the σ is, the greater is the impact (associated with changing the
value of σ) on the distribution of the projected future values of X. Putting the matter differently,
if there is already a lot of reliable information being transmitted to the electorate, then spending
campaign funding on further advertisements is probably not advisable because it will entail little
additional impact; whereas if there is very little information being transmitted, then it is worth
engaging in an additional advertisement campaign. This conclusion may be intuitively obvious,
however, what is less obvious from intuition alone is where one draws the line between these two
extremes. The advantage of working out the Fisher information is that it provides a quantitative
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measure that allows one to analyse such a problem. In particular, as regards the sensitivity of the
distribution on the information revelation parameter, the geodesic distance between the densities
associated with the parameter values σ and σ′ can be worked out in closed form (see [28] ), which
can be used to conduct a quantitative analysis on the cost-benefit analysis.
IX. TOWARDS ELECTION PLANNING: STRUCTURAL APPROACH
The two modelling approaches introduced in [10] are similar to the structural and reduced-form
models used in credit-risk management in finance and investment banking context [30]. In the
financial context, reduced-form models are commonly used because for a given financial contract,
the number of cash flows and the number of independent market factors related to it are typically so
vast that it is impractical to even attempt to dissect the product so as to identify its structural details.
In contrast, in the reduced-form approach it is possible to capture abstractly all the qualitative
features resulting from structural models, without going into any of the structural details, and
this makes the reduced-form approach more practical to implement. In the context of election
modelling, on the other hand, the structural approach is entirely feasible, for, (a) typically in an
election there are only a small number of plausible candidates; and (b) the number of important
independent issues relevant to a large number of voters is also relatively small.
In the present paper we have focused our attention on reduced-form models because (i) it cap-
tures all the qualitative features arising from structural models, thus making it an ideal framework
to conduct academic study of the system; (ii) one can pursue mathematical analysis quite far
without cluttering it with all the structural details; and (iii) the mathematical formalisms and de-
rived formulae carry through directly to structural models. However, if one were to apply the
information-based framework as a part of election planning, then structural models are consid-
erably more advantageous, for, there is a degree of abstraction in the reduced-form model that,
in some situations, makes it difficult to implement in practice. For instance, in the discussion in
Section VII on controlling the flow of information, this is feasible if the information is concerned
specifically with the candidate’s own positions on key issues, which would be the case in the struc-
tural approach. An analogous statement can be made on the material considered in Section VIII.
Thus, while the features of the information-basedmodel investigated here for electoral competition
can be well explored within the reduced form approach presented above, for a realistic implemen-
tation it is preferable to apply the techniques outlined in the present paper in the structural setup
of [10], where independent factors have realistic and tangible interpretations. In this connection
it is worth adding that for model calibration one may use (α) the current poll statistics to estimate
the a priori probabilities {pi}; (β) the magnitude of the volatility for the poll statistics to estimate
the information flow rate σ; and (γ) various public surveys conducted by pollsters to estimate the
density for the preference weights {wkn}. In the presence of disinformation, the distribution of {Ft}
can be estimated from data available to fact checkers.
With these in mind, we conclude by remarking that the analysis presented in this paper is
in fact applicable more generally to generic advertisements; not merely to election competition.
From this point of view we can regard the foregoing material as providing a new information-
based mathematical model for controlling information, as well as for characterising the impact of
advertisement.
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